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Abstract: We analyze a model of learning and belief formation in networks in which agents
follow Bayes rule yet they do not recall their history of past observations and cannot reason
about how other agents’ beliefs are formed. They do so by making rational inferences about
their observations which include a sequence of independent and identically distributed private
signals as well as the beliefs of their neighboring agents at each time. Fully rational agents would
successively apply Bayes rule to the entire history of observations. This leads to forebodingly
complex inferences due to lack of knowledge about the global network structure that causes
those observations. To address these complexities, we consider a “Learning without Recall”
model, which in addition to providing a tractable framework for analyzing the behavior of
rational agents in social networks, can also provide a behavioral foundation for the variety of
non-Bayesian update rules in the literature. We present the implications of various choices for
time-varying priors of such agents and how this choice affects learning and its rate.
1. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND
Agents exchange beliefs in social networks to benefit from
each other’s opinions and private information in trying to
learn an unknown state of the world. Rational agents in
a social network would apply Bayes rule successively to
their observations at each step, which include not only
their private signals but also the beliefs communicated by
their neighbors. However, such repeated applications of
Bayes rule in networks become very complex, especially if
the agents are unaware of the global network structure.
This is due to the fact that the agents at each step
should use their local data that is increasing with time,
and make very complex inferences about possible signal
structures leading to their observations. Indeed, tractable
modeling and analysis of rational behavior in networks
is an important problem in network economics and have
attracted much attention, Acemoglu et al. (2011); Mueller-
Frank (2013); Mossel et al. (2014).
To avoid the complexities of fully rational inference, a
variety of non-Bayesian update rules have been proposed
that rely on the seminal work of DeGroot (1974) in linear
opinion pooling, where agents update their opinions to
a convex combination of their neighbors’ beliefs and the
coefficients correspond to the level of confidence that
each agent puts in each of her neighbors. More recently,
Jadbabaie et al. (2012, 2013) consider a variation of this
model for streaming observations, where in addition to the
neighboring beliefs the agents also receive private signals.
Other forms of non-Bayesian rules were studied by Bala
and Goyal (1998) who consider a variation of observational
learning in which agents observe the action and pay-offs
of their neighbors and make rational inferences about
these action/pay-off correspondence together with the
⋆ This work was supported by ARO MURI W911NF-12-1-0509.
choices made by their neighbors, but ignore the fact
that their neighbors are themselves learning from their
own observations. More recently, Eyster and Rabin (2010)
consider models of autarkic play where players at each
generation observe their predecessor but na¨ıvely think
that any predecessor’s action relies solely on that player’s
private information, thus ignoring the possibility that
successive generations are learning from each other.
A chief contribution of this paper is establishing a behav-
ioral foundation for the existing non-Bayesian updates in
the literature where the belief update rule has a log-linear
structure. This paper addresses the question of how one
can limit the information requirement of a Bayesian up-
date and still ensure consensus or learning for the agents.
Some of the non-Bayesian update rules have the property
that they resemble the replication of a first step of a
Bayesian update from a common prior, and the aim here
is to formalize such a setup. For instance DeMarzo et al.
(2003) interpret the weights in the DeGroot model as those
assigned initially by rational agents to the noisy opinions of
their neighbors based on their perceived precision. How-
ever, by repeatedly applying the same weights over and
over again, the agents ignore the need to update these
weights with the increasing information.
To this end, we propose the so-called Learning without
Recall model as a belief formation and update rule for
Rational but Memoryless agents. We show how such a
scheme can provide convergence and learning for all agents
in a strongly connected social network so long as the truth
is identifiable through the aggregate observations of the
agents across entire network. This is of particular interest,
when the agents cannot distinguish the truth based solely
on their private observations, and yet together they learn.
2. THE LEARNING WITHOUT RECALL MODEL
Notation. Throughout the paper, N0 = {0} ∪ N is the
set of positive integers and zero. Boldface letters denote
random variables, the identity matrix is denoted by I, and
‖·‖ is a vector norm. We use Greek letters to denote certain
variables of interest such as: agents beliefs (µ), log-ratio
of beliefs (φ), log-likelihood ratio of signals (λ), and log-
ratio of initial prior beliefs (ψ). We consider a network
of n agents labeled by [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}, that interact
according to a directed graph G = ([n], E), where E ⊂ [n]×
[n] is the set of directed edges. Each agent is labeled by a
unique element of the set [n]. N (i) = {j ∈ [n]; (j, i) ∈ E}
is the neighborhood of agent i, which is the set of all
agents whose beliefs can be observed by agent i. We let
deg(i) =| N (i) | be the degree of node i corresponding to
the number of agent i’s neighbors.
Signals and Environment. We denote by Θ the finite
set of states of the world. Also, ∆Θ represents the space
of all probability measures on the set Θ. Each agent’s goal
is to decide amongst the finitely many possibilities in the
state space Θ. A random variable θ is chosen randomly
from Θ by nature and according to the probability measure
ν(·) ∈ ∆Θ, which satisfies ν(θˇ) > 0, ∀θˇ ∈ Θ. For each
agent i, there exists a finite signal space denoted by Si,
and given θ, ℓi(· | θ) is a probability measure on Si, which
is referred to as the signal structure or likelihood function
of agent i. The private signals for agent i are generated
according to ℓi(· | θ). Let Ω be an infinite product space
encompassing the state θ and the private signals {si,t, i ∈
[n], t ∈ N0}. Let P{·} be the probability measure on Ω with
the corresponding expectation operator E{·}, assigning
probabilities consistently with the distribution ν(·) and
the likelihood functions ℓi(· | θ), i ∈ [n]. Conditioned
on θ, the random variables {si,t , i ∈ [n], t ∈ W} are
independent. Consequently, the privately observed signals
are independent and identically distributed over time and
independent across the agents.
Beliefs. We let µi,t(·) be a probability distribution on
the set Θ representing the opinion or belief at time t of
agent i about the realized value of θ. The goal is to study
asymptotic learning, i.e. for each agent to learn the true
realized value of θ asymptotically; we denote this truth by
θ ∈ Θ. Hence, learning amounts to having µi,t(·) converge
to a point mass centered at θ, where the convergence could
be in probability or in the stronger almost sure sense that
we use in this work.
At t = 0 the value θ = θ is selected by nature. Followed
by that, si,0 for each i ∈ [n] is realized and observed by
agent i. Then the agent forms an initial Bayesian opinion
µi,0(·) about the value of θ. Given si,0, and using Bayes
rule for each agent i ∈ [n], the initial belief in terms of the
observed signal si,0 is given by:
µi,0(θˇ) =
νi(θˇ)ℓi(si,0 | θˇ)∑
θˆ∈Θ
νi(θˆ)ℓi(si,0 | θˆ)
, (1)
where νi(·) ∈ ∆Θ is an initial full-support (νi(θˆ) > 0,
∀θˆ ∈ Θ) prior belief associated with agent i; it represents
the subjective biases of agnet i even before making any
observations. In particular, for an unbiased agent we have
that ν(θˆ) = 1/|Θ|, ∀θˆ ∈ Θ.
If we assume that each agent i knows the initial priors of
her neighbors: νj(·), j ∈ N (i), 1 then Bayes rule can be
exploited to derive the refined opinion µi,1(·) after agent
i observes her neighbors’ initial beliefs {µj,0(·); j ∈ N (i)}
given by (1). Following Rahimian et al. (2014) this leads
to
µi,1(θˇ) =
νi(θˇ)li(si,0 | θˇ)
(∏
j∈N (i)
µj,0(θˇ)
νj(θˇ)
)
∑
θˆ∈Θ νi(θˆ)li(si,0 | θˆ)
(∏
j∈N (i)
µj,0(θˆ)
νj(θˆ)
) . (2)
How should the belief be updated in the next time steps?
A Bayesian agent who cannot recall how the neighbors’
beliefs are updated might instead imitate the preceding
structure for all the following time steps t > 1. Indeed,
in (2) we can substitute si,t, µi,t(·), and µj,t−1(·) for si,0,
µi,1(·), µj,0(·). How should the agent update the priors?
We study various choices for νj(·), ∀j .
To proceed, for each agent i we also replace νj(·), ∀j
with a time-varying distribution ξi,j(·, t), and argue that
a Rational but Memoryless agent i would make her ra-
tional inference about the opinion µj,t−1(·) that agent j
reports to her at time t according to some time-varying
prior ξi,j(·, t), j ∈ [n]. Here, any choice of distributions
ξi,j(·, t), j ∈ [n] should satisfy the information constraints
of a Rational but Memoryless agent, so long as such a
choice does not require an agent to recall any information
other than what she has just observed si,t and what her
neighbors have just reported to her µj,t−1(·), j ∈ N (i). A
memoryless yet rational agent of this type can process the
beliefs of her neighbors, but cannot recall how these beliefs
were formed. Accordingly, (2) becomes
µi,t(θˇ) = (3)
ξi,i(θˇ, t)li(si,t | θˇ)
(∏
j∈N (i)
µj,t−1(θˇ)
ξi,j(θˇ,t)
)
∑
θˆ∈Θ ξi,i(θˆ, t)li(si,t | θˆ)
(∏
j∈N (i)
µj,t−1(θˆ)
ξi,j(θˆ,t)
) ,
for all θˇ ∈ Θ and at any t > 1. In writing (3), the time
one update is regarded as a function that maps the priors,
the private signal, and the neighbors’ beliefs to the agent’s
posterior belief; and in using the time one update in the
subsequent steps as in (3), every time agent i regards each
of her neighbors j ∈ N (i) as having started from some
prior belief ξi,j(·, t) and arrived at their currently reported
belief µj,t−1(·) directly after observing a private signal,
hence rejecting any possibility of a past history. Such a
rule is of course not the optimum Bayesian update of agent
i’s belief at any step t > 1, because the agent is not taking
into account the complete observed history of her private
signals and neighboring beliefs and is instead, basing her
inference entirely on the immediately observed signal and
1 The assumption of (common) knowledge of priors in the case of
rational (Bayesian) agents can be justified as follows: given the same
observations of an agent j and in the absence of any past observations
or additional data, any agent i should make the same (rational)
inference; in the sense that starting form the same belief about the
unknown, their updated beliefs given the same observations would
be the same, or in Aumann’s words, rational agents cannot agree to
disagree, Aumann (1976).
neighboring beliefs; hence, the name memoryless. In the
next section, we address the choice of random and time-
varying priors ξi,j(·, t), j ∈ N (i) while examining the
properties of convergence and learning under the update
rules in (3).
3. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF CONVERGENCE &
LEARNING WITH LOG-LINEAR UPDATES
We begin by forming the log-ratios of beliefs, signals,
and priors under the true and false states as φi,t(θˇ) :=
log(µi,t(θˇ)/µi,t(θ)), λi,t(θˇ) := log
(
ℓi(si,t|θˇ)/ℓi(si,t|θ)
)
,
and γi,j(θˇ, t) := log(ξi,j(θˇ, t)/ξi,j(θ, t)) for all i, j and t.
Consequently, (3) can be linearized as follows:
φi,t(θˇ) =γi,i(θˇ, t) + λi,t(θˇ) (4)
+
∑
j∈N (i)
(φj,t−1(θˇ)− γi,j(θˇ, t)).
The network graph structure is encoded by its adjacency
matrix A defined as [A]ij = 1 ⇐⇒ (j, i) ∈ E , and
[A]ij = 0 otherwise. For a strongly connected G the Perron-
Frobenius theory, cf. (Seneta, 2006, Theorem 1.5), implies
that A has a simple positive real eigenvalue, denoted by
ρ > 0, which is equal to its spectral radius. Moreover, the
left eigenspace associated with ρ is one-dimensional with
the corresponding eigenvector α = (α1, . . . , αn)
T , uniquely
satisfying
∑n
i=1 αi = 1, αi > 0, ∀i ∈ [n], and α
T
A = ρα
T
.
The quantity αi is also known as the eigenvector centrality
of vertex i in the network, cf. (Newman, 2010, Section 7.2).
Multiplying both sides of (4) by αi and summing over all
i we obtain that
Φt(θˇ) = tr{Ξt(θˇ)}+Λt(θˇ) (5)
+ ρΦt−1(θˇ)− tr{Ξt(θˇ)A
T }
=
t∑
τ=0
ρτ
(
Λt−τ + tr{(I −A
T )Ξt−τ (θˇ)}
)
whereΦt(θˇ) :=
∑n
i=1 αiφi,t(θˇ) andΛt(θˇ) :=
∑n
i=1 αiλi,t(θˇ)
are global (network-wide) random variables, and Ξt(θˇ) is
a random n × n matrix whose i, j-th entry is given by
[Ξt(θˇ)]i,j = αiγi,j(θˇ, t). At each epoch of time, Φt(θˇ)
characterizes how biased (away from the truth and towards
θˇ) the network beliefs are, and Λt(θˇ) measures the infor-
mation content of the received signal across all the agents
in the network. Note that in writing (5), we use the fact
that
n∑
i=1
αi
∑
j∈N (i)
φj,t−1(θˇ) = α
T
Aφt−1(θˇ)
= ρα
T
φt−1(θˇ) = ρΦt−1(θˇ),
where φt(θˇ) := (φ1,t(θˇ), . . . ,φn,t(θˇ))
T . On the other hand,
since the received signal vectors {si,t, i ∈ [n], t ∈ N0} are
i.i.d. over time, {Λt(θˇ), t ∈ N0} constitutes a sequence of
i.i.d. random variables satisfying
E
{
Λt(θˇ)
}
=
n∑
i=1
αiE{λi,t(θˇ)} =
n∑
i=1
αiλi(θˇ) 6 0, (6)
where λ(θˇ) := (λ1(θˇ), . . . , λn(θˇ))
T :=
−
(
DKL
(
ℓ1(·|θ)||ℓ1(·|θˇ)
)
, . . . , DKL
(
ℓn(·|θ)||ℓn(·|θˇ)
))T
,
and the non-positivity of (6) follows from the infor-
mation inequality for the Kullback-Leibler divergence:
DKL (·||·) ≥ 0, and is strict whenever ℓi(·|θˇ) 6≡ ℓi(·|θ) for
some i, i.e. ∃s ∈ Si, i ∈ [n] such that ℓi(s|θˇ) 6= ℓi(s|θ), cf.
(Cover and Thomas, 2006, Theorem 2.6.3). In particular,
if for all θˇ 6= θ there exists an agent i with λi(θˇ) < 0,
then E
{
Λt(θˇ)
}
< 0 and we say that the truth θ is globally
identifiable. Indeed, if any agent is to learn the truth, then
we need that Φt(θˇ)→ −∞ as t→∞ for all the false states
θˇ 6= θ. However, in a strongly connected graph every node
has a degree greater than or equal to one so that ρ ≥ 1,
(Brualdi, 2011, Chapter 2). If ρ > 1, then the term ρtΛ0(θˇ)
increases in variance as t→∞, and unless Λ0(θˇ) < ǫ with
P-probability one for some ǫ < 0, almost sure convergence
to −∞ for Φt(θˇ) in (5) cannot hold true. In a directed cir-
cle where ρ = 1, one may take ξi,j(·, t) ≡ νj(·) ≡ ν(·) for all
i, j and t. Consequently, at each epoch of time each agent i
assumes that all her neighbors have started from the initial
common prior belief ν(·) and have arrived at their current
beliefs directly, thus forgetting any history of observed
signals and exchanged opinions. The geometric progression
in (5) then reduces to sum of i.i.d. variables in L1; and by
the strong law of large numbers, cf. (Feller, 1968, Section
X.1), it converges almost surely to the mean value; hence,
Φt(θˇ) = β(θˇ) +
∑t
τ=0Λτ (θˇ) → β(θˇ) + (t + 1)E
{
Λ0(θˇ)
}
→ −∞, as t → ∞, provided that E
{
Λ0(θˇ)
}
< 0, i.e. the
truth is globally identifiable. Here β(θˇ) := α
T
ψ(θˇ), where
ψ(θˇ) :=
(
ψ1(θˇ), . . . , ψn(θˇ)
)T
is the stacked vector of initial
prior log-ratios with ψi(θˇ) := log(νi(θˇ)/νi(θ)), ∀i ∈ [n].
Thus as defined, β(θˇ) measures the network-wide bias in
the agents’ initial priors toward the state θˇ. Accordingly,
(3) for a circular network with common priors becomes
µi,t(θˆ) =
µj,t−1(θˆ)ℓi(si,t | θˆ)∑
θˆ∈Θ
µj,t−1(θˆ)ℓi(si,t | θˆ)
, ∀θˆ ∈ Θ, (7)
where j ∈ [n] is the unique vertex j ∈ N (i). The above
is the same as Bayesian update of a single agent (with
no neighbors to communicate with), except that the self
belief µi,t−1(·) in the right-hand side is replaced by the
belief µj,t−1(·) of the unique neighbor {j} = N (i) in the
circle.
Rahimian and Jadbabaie (2015) show that under (7)
the agents in a directed circle learn the truth asym-
pototically exponentially fast and at the rate minθˇ 6=θ
(−1/n)
∑n
i=1 λi(θˇ), so that limt→∞
1
t φi,t(θˇ) = (1/n)∑n
i=1 λi(θˇ), almost surely, for all θˇ 6= θ. Rahimian et al.
(2015) show the application of the update rule in (7) to
general strongly connected topologies (no necessarily cir-
cular), where agents have more than just a single neighbor
in their neighborhoods. Accordingly, at every step of time
agent i chooses a neighbor j ∈ N (i) independently at ran-
dom and applies (7) with the reported belief of the chosen
neighbor. The probabilities for the choice of neighbors at
every point in time are given by a row stochastic matrix
P , with entries [P ]ij > 0 for every j ∈ N (i). Each entry
[P ]ij is the probability for neighbor j being chosen by
agent i at any point in time. Subsequently, we can show
that the belief ratio for agent i at every time t is given
as the sum of log-likelihood ratios of private signals of
various agents across the network and at times 0 to t. The
choice of agent at every time is given by a random walk iτ ,
τ ∈ [t] that starts from node i0 = i at time t and proceeds
in the reversed time direction, eventually terminating at
some node it. Accordingly, the log-belief ratio of agent
i at any time t can be expressed as φi,t(θˇ) = ψit(θˇ)
+
∑t
τ=0 λiτ ,t−τ (θˇ). Next note from the ergodic theorem,
cf. (Norris, 1999, Theorem 1.10.2), that the average time
spent in any state m ∈ [n] converges almost surely to its
stationary probability πm associated with the probability
transition matrix P , and this together with the strong law
yields limt→∞
1
t φi,t(θˇ) =
∑n
i=1 πiλi(θˇ), almost surely
for all θˇ 6= θ. Hence if the truth is globally identifiable,
then in a strongly connected network every agent learns
the truth at an asymptotic rate that is exponentially fast
and is expressed above, as the sum of the relative entropies
between the signal structures of every agent weighted by
the stationary distribution of the random walk, which
recovers the same asymptotic rate for the update proposed
by Jadbabaie et al. (2013).
Fixing the priors over time will not result in convergence of
beliefs, except in very specific cases as discussed above. In
the sequel, we investigate the properties of convergence
and learning under the update rules in (3), where the
parameterizing priors ξi,j(·, t) are chosen to be random
and time-varying variables, leading to the log-linear up-
dating of the agents’ beliefs over time. We distinguish two
cases depending on whether the agents do not recall their
own self-beliefs or they do, leading respectively to time-
invariant or time-varying log-linear update rules.
3.1 Priors Set to a Geometric Average
It is notable that the memoryless Bayesian update in
(3) has a log-linear structure similar to the Non-Bayesian
update rules studied by Rahnama Rad and Tahbaz-Salehi
(2010); Shahrampour and Jadbabaie (2013); Nedic´ et al.
(2014); Lalitha et al. (2014); Bandyopadhyay and Chung
(2014); and the roots for such a geometric averaging of the
neighboring beliefs can be traced to logarithmic opinion
pools as studied by Gilardoni and Clayton (1993) and
Rufo et al. (2012). Motivated by this analogy, we propose
setting the time-varying priors ξi,j(·, t), j ∈ N (i) of each
agent i and at every time t, proportionally to the geometric
average of the beliefs reported to her by all her neighbors
at every time t:
∏
j∈N (i) µj,t−1(·)
1/d(i)
. Therefore, (3)
becomes
µi,t(θˇ) =
li(si,t | θˇ)
(∏
j∈N (i) µj,t−1(θˇ)
)1/d(i)
∑
θˆ∈Θ li(si,t | θˆ)
(∏
j∈N (i) µj,t−1(θˆ)
)1/d(i) .
To analyze the evolution of beliefs with this choice of
priors, let λt(θˇ) := (λ1,t(θˇ), . . . ,λn,t(θˇ))
T be the stacked
vector of log-likelihood ratios of received signals for all
agents at time t. Hence, we can write the vectorized update
φt(θˇ) = Tφt−1(θˇ) + λt(θˇ), where T is the normalized
adjacency of the graph defined by [T ]ij =
1
d(i) [A]ij for
all i and j. We can now iterate the vectorized update to
get φt(θˇ) =
∑t
τ=0 T
τλt−τ (θˇ) + T
tψ(θˇ). Next note from
the analysis of convergence for DeGroot model, cf. (Golub
and Jackson, 2010, Proporition 1), that for a strongly
connected network G if it is aperiodic (meaning that one
is the greatest common divisor of the lengths of all its
circles), then limτ→∞ T
τ = 1s
T
, where s := (s1, . . . , sn)
T
is the unique left eigenvector associated with the unit
eigenvalue of T and satisfying
∑n
i=1 si = 1, si > 0,
∀i. Hence, the Cesa`ro mean together with the strong
law implies that limt→∞
1
t φi,t(θˇ) = −
∑n
i=1 siλi(θˇ),
almost surely for all θˇ 6= θ, and the agents learn the
truth asymptotically exponentially fast, at the rate minθˇ 6=θ∑n
i=1−siλi(θˇ).
3.2 Agents who Recall Their Self Beliefs
If the agents i ∈ [n] recall their self-beliefs µi,t−1(·), i ∈ [n]
when making decisions or performing inferences at time t,
then we set ξi,i(·, t) ≡ µi,t−1(·) for all i and t. Furthermore,
we set ξi,j(·, t) ≡ µj,t−1(·)
ηt/ζj(t) for all i, j ∈ N (i) and
t, where ζj(t) :=
∑
θˆ∈Θµj,t−1(θˆ)
ηt is the normalization
constant to make the exponentiated probabilities sum to
one. The choice of 0 < ηt < 1 as time-varying exponents
to be determined shortly, is motivated by the requirements
of convergence under (3). Subsequently, we investigate
the following log-linear update rule with time-varying
coefficients
φi,t(θˇ) = φi,t−1(θˇ) + λi,t(θˇ) + (1 − ηt)
∑
j∈N (i)
φj,t−1(θˇ),
where 1 − ηt is the weight that the agent puts on her
neighboring beliefs (relative to her own) at any time t.
Using xt := ρ(1 − ηt) and B := (1/ρ)A, the previous
equation can be written in vectorized format as follows
φt(θˇ) =(I + xtB)φt−1(θˇ) + λt(θˇ)
=
t∑
τ=0
P (t,τ)λτ (θˇ) + P
(t,0)ψ(θˇ), (8)
where P (t,t) := I, and P (t,τ) :=
∏t
u=τ+1(I + xuB) for
τ < t. Next note that P (t,τ) can be expanded as follows
P (t,τ) =
t−τ∑
j=0
M
(t,τ)
j B
j ,
where M
(t,τ)
0 = 1, τ ≤ t and
M
(t,τ)
j =
t−j+1∑
u1=τ+1
t−j+2∑
u2=u1+1
. . .
t∑
uj=uj−1+1
xu1xu2 . . . xuj .
Consequently, (8) can be rewritten as
φt(θˇ) = (9)
t∑
τ=0
t−τ∑
j=0
M
(t,τ)
j B
jλτ (θˇ) +
t∑
j=0
M
(t,0)
j B
jψ(θˇ),
To proceed, for fixed τ and j let M
(τ)
j := limt→∞M
(t,τ)
j .
Next consider the summands in (9) for each τ , 0 ≤
τ ≤ t. Note that for j fixed, {Bjλτ (θˇ), τ ∈ N0} is
a sequence of independent and identically distributed
random vectors. On the other hand, since B has unit
spectral radius and given that xu > 0, having M
(0)
1 :=∑∞
u=1 xu < ∞ is sufficient to ensure that the random
vectors M
(t,τ)
j B
jλτ (θˇ) are all in L2 and have variances
that are bounded uniformly in the choice of t, τ . This is
because for any t, τ , and j we have that
M
(t,τ)
j ≤M
(τ)
j ≤M
(0)
j ≤
1
j!
(
M
(0)
1
)j
,
all as a consequence of positivity, xu > 0. In particular,
with M
(0)
1 <∞ we can bound∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
j=0
M
(0)
j B
jψ(θˇ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
∞∑
j=0
M
(0)
j
∥∥Bjψ(θˇ)∥∥
≤
∥∥ψ(θˇ)∥∥ exp(M01 ), (10)
so that the contribution made by the initial bias of the
network is asymptotically bounded and therefore sub-
dominant when
lim
t→∞
t∑
τ=0
t−τ∑
j=0
M
(t,τ)
j B
jλτ (θˇ) = (−∞)n ,
almost surely; here, by (−∞)n we mean the entry-wise
convergence of the column vector to −∞ for the each of
the n entries, corresponding to the n agents. In the sequel
we investigate conditions under which this almost sure
convergence would hold true.
We begin by noting that the conditionM
(0)
1 <∞ is indeed
necessary for convergence, because if M
(0)
1 =∞, then the
term M
(t,0)
1 Bλ0(θˇ) appearing in (9) for j = 1 and τ = 0
increases unbounded in its variance as t→∞, so that (9)
cannot converge in an almost sure sense.
Next note that with M
(0)
1 < ∞ we can invoke Kol-
mogorov’s criterion, (Feller, 1968, Section X.7), to get that
as t → ∞ the summation in (9) converges almost surely
to its expected value, i.e. the following almost sure limit
holds true
lim
t→∞
φi,t(θˇ) = (11)
∞∑
τ=0
∞∑
j=0
M
(τ)
j
[
Bjλ(θˇ)
]
i
+
∞∑
j=0
M
(0)
j
[
Bjψ(θˇ)
]
i
,
the second term being bounded per (10). Moreover, for
a strongly connected social network G, if it is aperiodic,
then the matrix B is a primitive matrix; and in particular
for all j ≥ d := diam(G) + 1, every entry of Bj is strictly
greater than zero, and if the truth is globally identifiable
then one can take an absolute constant ǫ > 0 such that[
Bjλ(θˇ)
]
i
< −ǫ whenever j ≥ d, while
[
Bjλ(θˇ)
]
i
≤ 0 for
any j. Subsequently, we get that
∞∑
τ=0
∞∑
j=0
M
(τ)
j
[
Bjλ(θˇ)
]
i
≤ −ǫ
∞∑
τ=0
∞∑
j=d
M
(τ)
j . (12)
Combining the results of (10), (11) and (12) leads to the
following characterization: all agents will learn the truth
(that is limt→∞ φi,t(θˇ) = −∞, almost surely for all i and
any θˇ 6= θ), if M
(0)
1 < ∞ and
∑∞
τ=0
∑∞
j=dM
(τ)
j = ∞.
Notice the preceding conditions are indeed not far from
necessity. Firstly, we need M
(0)
1 <∞ to bound the growth
of variance for convergence, as noted above. Moreover,
with B having a unit spectral radius we can bound∣∣[Bjλ(θˇ)]
i
∣∣ ≤ ∥∥Bjλ(θˇ)∥∥ ≤ ∥∥λ(θˇ)∥∥ ,
so that we can lower-bound limt→∞ φi,t(θˇ) in (11) as
follows
−
∥∥λ(θˇ)∥∥
∞∑
τ=0
∞∑
j=0
M
(τ)
j −
∥∥ψ(θˇ)∥∥ exp(M01 ) ≤ limt→∞φi,t(θˇ).
Consequently, if
∑∞
τ=0
∑∞
j=0M
(τ)
j < ∞, then limt→∞
φi,t(θˇ)
is almost surely bounded away from −∞ and agents do
not learn the truth.
For a strongly connected and aperiodic social network G,
matrix B has a single eigenvalue at one (corresponding
to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency A) and all
of the other eigenvalues of B have magnitudes strictly
less than one. Therefore, by the iterations of the power
method, (Newman, 2010, Section 11.1), we know that[
Bjλ(θˇ)
]
i
converges to
∑n
k=1 αkλk(θˇ) for every i, and the
convergence is geometrically fast in the magnitude-ratio of
the first and second largest eigenvalues of the adjacency
matrix A. Subsequently, for a strongly connected and
aperiodic social network G, we can replace −ǫ and d
in (12) by ǫ +
∑n
i=1 αiλi(θˇ) < 0 and some constant
D(ǫ). Here, ǫ > 0 is a small but arbitrary and D(ǫ) is
chosen large enough in accordance with the geometric rate
of
[
Bjλ(θˇ)
]
i
→
∑n
k=1 αkλk(θˇ), such that |
[
Bjλ(θˇ)
]
i
−∑n
k=1 αkλk(θˇ)| < ǫ for all j ≥ D(ǫ), and the analysis of
convergence and its rate can thus be refined.
Furthermore, having
K1 < lim inf
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=0
t−τ∑
j=d
M
(t,τ)
j
≤ lim sup
t→∞
1
t
t∑
τ=0
t−τ∑
j=d
M
(t,τ)
j < K2
for some positive constants 0 < K1 < K2 implies that the
learning rate is asymptotically exponentially fast, as was
the case for all the other update rules that we discussed
in this paper. However, depending on how slow or fast
(compared to t) is the convergence
∑t
τ=0
∑t−τ
j=dM
(t,τ)
j →
∞ as t→∞, the almost sure asymptotic rate at which for
some θˇ 6= θ and i ∈ [n], µi,t(θˇ) → 0 as t → ∞ could be
slower or faster than an exponential.
Time-Invariant Log-Linear Updates withWeighted
Self-Beliefs. For such agents as in Subsection 3.2 who
recall their immediate self-beliefs µi,t(·), if we relax the
requirement that ξi,i(·, t) ≡ µi,t−1(·) then it is possible to
achieve asymptotic almost sure exponentially fast learning
using time-invariant updates just as in Subsection 3.1.
In particular, for any 0 < η < 1 fixed, we can set
ξi,i(·, t) proportional to µi,t−1(·)
η for all i, and we can
further set ξi,j(·, t) at every time t, for any i, and all j ∈
N (i) proportional to µj,t−1(·)
1−(1−η)/d(i). Subsequently,
(3) becomes
µi,t(θˇ) =
li(si,t | θˇ)µi,t−1(θˇ)
η
(∏
j∈N (i) µj,t−1(θˇ)
) 1−η
d(i)
∑
θˆ∈Θ
li(si,t | θˆ)µi,t−1(θˆ)
η
(∏
j∈N (i) µj,t−1(θˆ)
) 1−η
d(i)
.
(13)
To analyze (13), we form the log-belief and likelihood
ratios and set B = (ηI + (1 − η)T ), where T is the same
normalized adjacency as in Subsection 3.1. Hence, we re-
cover the vectorized iterations φt(θˇ) = Bφt−1(θˇ)+λt(θˇ) =∑t
τ=0B
τλt−τ (θˇ) + B
tψ(θˇ) and it follows from (Kemeny
and Snell, 1960, Theorems 5.1.1 and 5.1.2) that for a
strongly connected network G, limτ→∞Bτ = 1s
T
, where
s := (s1, . . . , sn)
T is the unique stationary distribution
associated with the Markov chain whose probability transi-
tion matrix is T (or equivalently B); whence it follows from
the Cesa`ro mean and the strong law that the agents learn
the truth asymptotically exponentially fast, at the rate
minθˇ 6=θ
∑n
i=1−siλi(θˇ), similar to Subsection 3.1. Note
that here, unlike Subsection 3.1 but similarly to Rahimian
et al. (2015), we only use properties of ergodic chains and
existence and uniqueness of their stationary distributions;
hence, relaxing the requirement for the social network to
be aperiodic.
Concluding Remarks. Learning without recall is a
model of belief aggregation in networks by replicating the
rule that maps the initial priors, neighboring beliefs, and
private signal to Bayesian posterior at one time step for
all future time steps; this way the complexities of a fully
rational inference at the forthcoming epochs are avoided,
while some essential features of Bayesian inference are
preserved. We showed how appropriate choice of priors
for the so-called rational but memoryless agents in this
model can provide a behavioral foundation for the log-
linear structure of some of the non-Bayesian update rules
that are studied in the literature. We further investigated
the rate and requirements of asymptotic and almost sure
learning with these choices of priors. In particular, we
identified
∑∞
u=1 xu <∞ as a necessary condition for con-
vergence of beliefs with log-linear time-varying updates, in
the case of agents who have no recollection of the past, ex-
cepting their own immediate beliefs. With xt representing
the relative weight on the neighboring beliefs, such agents
facing individual identification problems can still learn the
truth in a strongly connected and aperiodic network by
relying on each other’s observations; provided that as time
evolves they put less and less weight on the neighboring
beliefs and rely more on their private observations: xt → 0
as t→∞.
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